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As the narrative of globalisation in crisis heats up, China has stepped up as a new cham-
pion of globalisation with its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. This article repositions ‘China in the 
Global South’ to the front and centre of the globalisation discourse. Through a triangular 
framework, I differentiate and reconnect the three ‘master’ processes of urbanisation, de-
velopment and globalisation to understand the inside-outside connections between China’s 
domestic transformation and strong impact in the Global South. Using China vs Southeast 
Asia and Central Asia, I document how China’s westward development has created new 
development opportunities for its overland neighbours and beyond.
Keywords: globalisation, urbanisation, development, China, global south
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Introduction
Globalisation is an inherently uneven spatial 
process that tracks the unequal cross-national 
distribution of economic and political power. 
This power is leveraged by certain dom-
inant nations’ comparative and competitive 
strengths during given eras of world history. 
Increasingly, dominant global influence from 
certain nation states has shifted towards their 
powerful global cities or other cities with stra-
tegic and special functions. The overlap and 
mismatch between national and urban power 
creates more complex spatial inequalities 
at the regional and local levels. It can how-
ever also generate cooperative tendencies to 
counter and ameliorate unequal development 
and spatial disparity.
These shifts and their consequences raise 
new questions about how to understand the 
two basic dimensions of national vs city based 
influence on nearby and faraway places and 
people: scale and connectivity. While ‘scale’ rep-
resents important attributes of discrete origins 
or locales of power, ‘connectivity’ embodies 
the relational aspect of influence. The greater 
scale and scope of power originates from more 
strategic locations, more key points of contact 
and their stronger spillovers. Stronger connec-
tivity of power stems from the larger number, 
greater variety and greater intensity of connec-
tions that are both virtual through financial net-
works, and physical via transport links. Relative 
to the heavy focus on the power and connec-
tivity of global financial networks, the latter 
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deserves our renewed attention in the light of 
China’s infrastructure-led approach to globali-
sation, treated in this article.
While the scale and connectivity of power 
underpin the more conventional reach and 
impact of globalisation, their continued im-
portance has recently been entangled with the 
shifting political ideologies of existing powerful 
states that have also been the biggest drivers 
of globalisation. With the rhetoric of ‘America 
First’ and withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, the USA under President Trump 
has taken a big step back from globalisation. 
Although Brexit may not be exactly anti-global, 
this move also reflects a backlash against the 
practices of globalisation such as open borders 
and immigration.
These retreats from globalisation look like 
temporary setbacks from the long history of 
globalisation. Taking a very long view, Chanda 
(2007) saw the Silk Road as an early mani-
festation of globalisation in terms of long-
distance trade. If we emphasise the broad 
scope and accelerated speed of more varied 
and dense global flows, it would make sense 
to date the beginning of globalisation to the 
1970s. Supporting this timing of globalisation 
was China opening its doors and joining the 
global economy around 1980. This helped to 
usher in a growing body of scholarship advo-
cating globalisation as reflecting an open and 
‘borderless’ world economy (see Chen, 2005). 
Globalisation has since moved up a big notch, 
measured in trade as a share of the world’s 
GDP, which rose from 39% in 1980 to 60% 
in 2008.1 Despite the global financial crisis in 
2008, globalisation measured in the compos-
ite Global Connectedness Index rebounded 
through 2015 (Ghemawat, 2017).
As globalisation becomes more intensified, 
it has brought to light negative consequences, 
such as the erosion of national sovereignty 
and growing income inequality. Looking back 
through the lens of the Great Depression, James 
(2008) found an important part of its cause in 
the resentments against global capital flows, 
trade and migration, and drew this as a les-
son for contemporary globalisation. Critiquing 
globalisation as a paradox from a Western 
perspective, Rodrik (2011) contends that eco-
nomic globalisation cannot co-exist with both 
democratic politics and national sovereignty, 
one of which must be sacrificed for pursuing 
globalisation.
Having benefited considerably from global-
isation, China has become a counter to this 
paradox. It has pursued globalisation with a 
strong single Party-state, which does not have 
to worry about the erosion of democracy or 
loss of sovereignty. China has also gained con-
siderable confidence and stature from becom-
ing more globally connected and integrated. 
Against the West’s recent retreats from global-
isation, China has stepped up to the front and 
centre of the pro-globalisation plate. President 
Xi Jinping spoke confidently about the virtue 
of open trade and the danger in retreating from 
it at the 2017 World Economic Forum. Backing 
up this rhetoric with strong action has been the 
accelerated implementation of the ambitious 
‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) that China 
launched in 2013. According to McKinsey’s 
new Financial Connectedness Ranking, a key 
dimension of China’s global connectedness has 
grown, with its outward stock of bank lending 
and foreign direct investment tripling from 
2007 to 2016 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2017).
China becoming the new champion of glo-
balisation intrigues me and poses two critical 
research questions. One is how does China 
lead globalisation in ways that differ from the 
Western economic powers? It calls for prob-
ing, if China can produce a different mode of 
globalisation, given its demographic size, newly 
acquired economic wealth and political insti-
tution. The other question is how to gauge the 
growing impact of China-led globalisation? It 
begs an investigation into whether China can 
deliver more benefits from its approach to glo-
balisation, by creating greater wealth while mit-
igating inequality. Both questions require a new 
starting point and deeper analysis beyond the 
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Globalisation redux
existing literature on globalisation, principally 
because China is a distinctive global power 
driven by a strong state. With a dual identity as 
both a leading global power and a large devel-
oping nation, at least for much of its interior, 
China’s approach to globalisation calls for 
fresh analysis. This article meets this scholarly 
challenge by examining China’s leading role in 
shaping a new era of globalisation via its wide-
spread and yet geographically concentrated in-
fluence in the Global South.
The article is organised as follows. The next 
section develops an integrated framework for 
understanding the sources, mechanisms and 
effects of Chinese globalisation, emphasising 
its inside-out dialectic logic. I intend the frame-
work to clarify the distinctive, if not exceptional, 
combination of China’s internal and external 
regional conditions that has catalysed its global 
initiatives across various Asian borderlands. The 
framework is then used to guide a pair of case 
studies focused on Southeast Asia and Central 
Asia, comparing how China’s global strategies 
are reshaping urban and regional landscapes 
around its borderlands and far beyond. The last 
section explores the broader implications from 
the interface between the framework and two 
case analyses.
Decoding China’s impact in the 
Global South
To the extent that we see the current phase of 
globalisation in some kind of crisis and China 
as a counter force to it, it invokes the trans-
lation of the English word ‘crisis’ into the 
Chinese language (危机), whose two characters 
literally mean ‘crisis-opportunity’. There may 
be a Chinese philosophical dialectic ring to the 
translation in conveying a sense of contradic-
tion or balance. If globalisation is in crisis, real 
or perceived, it may be accompanied by a set 
of new opportunities for creating an alterna-
tive approach to globalisation associated with 
China’s development policies and practices 
over the last three decades.
The scale dimension of China’s global eco-
nomic power is obvious. With a continental 
sized territory and world’s largest population, 
China sustained the largest share of the world’s 
GDP and peaked at around 35% by 1820, far 
ahead of the relative positions of the Western 
industrialising economies at that time. Having 
dropped to about 3% by 1980, China’s weight 
of the world’s GDP returned to around 15% 
today, two centuries after its historical zenith.2 
The combined force of reform, opening and 
transformation over only three decades has 
elevated China to (a) the world’s second larg-
est economy; (b) the world’s largest trading 
nation; (c) the world’s largest exporter; (d) the 
world’s largest manufacturer; (e) the world’s 
largest energy consumer; (f) the world’s larg-
est auto market; (g) the world’s largest user of 
steel, cement and copper; and (h) the world’s 
largest applicant for patents. All these superla-
tives magnify the scale dimension of China’s 
global economic power, but they tell us little 
about how these top rankings of China’s 
strength translate into real impact, and how and 
where this impact is truly felt. Scale of power 
coupled with its connectivity is key to under-
standing China’s multifaceted influence across 
the Global South.
The large scale of economic power gener-
ally translates into an extensive connectivity 
of that power, even though this association is 
not always linear, and is instead contingent on 
how a given nation or city projects its internal 
strength in forming external connections car-
rying and extending a powerful influence. It 
also depends on how we think about measur-
ing the correlation between scale and connect-
ivity of a new and different global power like 
China. As China grew into the world’s top trad-
ing nation, trade as a share of its GDP, a more 
conventional measure of trade dependency or 
connectivity, rose from 9% in the 1960s to 37% 
in 2016.3 While this was a big increase, from a 
time when China was basically closed to world 
trade, China’s current share of its GDP is ex-
pectedly small relative to its overall economic 
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scale. It is smaller than the world’s average 
of 58%, and even slightly lower than India’s 
40%, while the export manufacturing power-
house of Germany registered at 84% for 2016.4 
Looking at global economic power from a dif-
ferent comparative vantage point, the number 
of countries for which China is the largest trad-
ing partner stands at 124, relative to 56 for the 
USA (Khanna, 2016, Map 2). His map shows 
that the USA’s top trading ties are heavily con-
centrated in North America, Western Europe 
and the Caribbean, whereas most of China’s 
trade ties reach Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia 
and Australia. Map 3 in his book also shows the 
increasing centrality of East Asia with China at 
the core of supply chains and trade networks.
The combination of one long coast and 
one lengthy land border facilitates China’s 
trade with a larger number of countries, espe-
cially those around its (south)western borders, 
extending all the way to Europe and the Middle 
East. Factoring this geographical thinking trig-
gers other ways of measuring the connectivity 
dimension of power beyond conventional 
border and long-distance trade. More extensive 
overland contiguity or adjacency is conducive 
to the construction of transport infrastructure 
for linking more geographical points of trade 
and economic development. China is geo-
graphically endowed and positioned to do so. 
Favourable geographical conditions, however, 
are insufficient for enhancing the scale of power 
through extending its connectivity unless they 
are activated by domestic economic forces. To 
fully understand this set of factors inside and 
outside the Chinese context, we propose a tri-
partite framework below.
Triangulating China’s inside and 
outside
In the academic and policy scholarship on 
China’s global rise and impact, there is a ten-
dency to emphasise the scale and scope of 
China’s quest for commodities and energy, 
massive trade, growing outward investment 
and extensive infrastructure provision in the 
Global South (see Cardenal and Araújo, 2013; 
Economy and Levi, 2014; French, 2014). This 
prevalent narrative often leads to an inflated 
view that China’s rise will inevitably weaken 
the Western (US) dominance (Jacques, 2012) in 
a multipolar world, although others have tem-
pered this view by pointing to the possibility 
of constraining China’s partial global power 
(Christensen, 2015; Shambaugh, 2013).
To regionalise the discussion and analysis of 
China’s global impact, we need to recontextu-
alise it in the continued discourse and debate 
about the “Asian Century” that has been alive 
since the 1980s, when Japan instead of China 
was the rising Asian power. Its nuances aside, 
the ‘Asian Century’ debate features a persist-
ent split between two camps representing the 
euphoric and alarming sides, with China’s 
rise and its regional impact looming large on 
both sides. From the cheering side, Mahbubani 
(2008) attributed the rise of Asia, principally 
China, to their adoption of seven pillars of 
Western wisdom such as free-market econom-
ics, pragmatism and a culture of peace. While 
it is debatable if these are inherently Western 
wisdom, it reflects a Western-centric way of 
seeing Asia’s rise, with China at its centre, 
as following or imitating the West (also see 
Ferguson, 2012). The most recent voice cau-
tioning against the ‘Asian Century’ is Michael 
Auslin (2017), who provides a comprehensive 
account of the economic, military, political and 
demographic risks that may threaten Asia as a 
fractured region of stagnation and instability. 
This debate, often tinged by an outside Western 
imprint and outrun by dynamic trends, sheds 
little light on how China exerts new spatially 
focused impacts across Asia from its distinctive 
domestic urban development trajectory and 
outward-oriented BRI.
Moving beyond the more conventional 
debate, Anaya Roy (2016) has turned our ana-
lytical gaze towards the set of flows and transac-
tions crossing more intra-Asian boundaries that 
make the region less geographically bounded 
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Globalisation redux
in nation states and more in terms of inter-ref-
erenced urban and regional spaces. In shifting 
the central research question ‘Where is Asia?’ 
to ‘When is Asia?’, Roy has opened up a new 
spatio-temporal vista for analysing how China, 
as the economic core and geographical centre 
of a rising Asia, can affect the region’s present 
and future through its spatially ambitious BRI 
with its long horizon. Taking advantage of this 
new conceptual place of departure, I  follow a 
small number of recent attempts to trace the 
stages of China’s westward development from 
its domestic space to its western overland 
neighbours (Summers, 2016; Yeh and Wharton, 
2016). Moreover, I go a step further to offer a 
broader and more systematic framework for 
capturing and explaining China’s widespread 
impact in the Global South, which can in turn 
guide a focused comparison of this impact 
in Southeast Asia vs Central Asia. Figure  1 
presents this framework.
In Figure 1, I conceptualise China’s impact in 
the Global South as stemming from and feed-
ing back to three ‘master processes’ of urban-
isation, development and globalisation. China 
figures prominently in the literature on each 
of the three broad topics. The combined scale, 
speed and pathway of China’s urbanisation, 
development and globalisation reflect both 
the conventional and distinctive drivers and 
outcomes of these processes. While China had 
a low level of urbanisation and development 
with a high degree of economic closeness until 
three and a half decades ago, it has moved rap-
idly through all three processes, with inside and 
outside consequences that translate into an ex-
tensive footprint in the Global South. This calls 
for taking apart each leg of the triangle and 
then putting them back together.
Steering and feeding urbanisation
China’s urbanisation has generated a large 
body of research, with a heavy focus on some 
of the booming megacities like Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, especially on the massive migration 
and infrastructure construction (a familiar lit-
erature not necessary for review here, see the 
special ‘Urban Development in China’ issue 
of CJRES, November 2016). What is lacking 
is a distillation of the most salient features of 
China’s urbanisation, and of how it has inter-
acted with the world beyond its borders, espe-
cially its neighbouring countries or regions.
Figure 1. China’s triangular influence in the Global South.
Source: Conceived and drawn by the author.
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According to an official narrative,5 China’s 
urbanisation has avoided two ‘urbanisa-
tion traps’—the ‘overurbanisation’ in Latin 
America, where urban growth has exceeded 
economic development, especially job cre-
ation in cities, and the ‘poverty urbanisation’ in 
Africa, where cities have not delivered the ben-
efits of modernisation to rural migrants, who 
became poorer as informal settlers after per-
manently leaving agricultural land. This official 
policy spin aside, I summarise China’s distinct-
ive urbanisation as four ‘S’s’.
State steering
Generally speaking, China’s urbanisation 
begins and ends with the powerful state driv-
ing urbanisation with a very ‘visible hand’. This 
perspective sees the state crowding out other 
forces in shaping the rapid pace and large scale 
of China’s urban transformation. Despite its 
wide acceptance, the state-centric model of 
China’s urbanisation is not one-dimensional 
and spatially uniform. The state has acted verti-
cally with regard to how the central and muni-
cipal government interacted both cooperatively 
and competitively to drive urban growth. The 
state has also mattered horizontally in targeting 
different cities and regions with specific poli-
cies. The Chinese state takes on a distinctively 
steering role in using a variety of policies and 
interventions to guide China’s urbanisation 
(Chen, 2014).
The state’s steering of urban growth began 
with the creation of China’s first and largest 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Shenzhen, 
bordering Hong Kong, in 1979. Besides the 
soft steering of providing lower taxes as incen-
tives for Hong Kong investors, a stronger ver-
sion of steering was the state providing upfront 
financing for large-scale physical infrastructure 
to spur and support industrial growth. As this 
rapid growth later ran into bottlenecks such as 
the shortage of land and water, as well as envi-
ronmental degradation, the Shenzhen govern-
ment tightened restrictions on land approval 
and elevated environmental standards by 
banning polluting industries, including paper-
making and tanning (Chen and de’Medici, 
2010).
As Shenzhen took off in the 1980s, the state’s 
steering of urban growth moved north along 
China’s eastern seaboard, with the designa-
tion of 14 other coastal cities as Open Cities 
in 1984 and their state-financed Economic and 
Technology Development Zones (ETDZs). 
The construction of residential towers and 
shopping malls also began to scale up and 
spread around the booming coastal cities. With 
the state steering more resources into inter-city 
transport infrastructure, adjacent secondary 
cities benefited from the positive spillover 
effects from hubs like Shenzhen and Shanghai, 
leading to regional economic agglomeration 
in the Pearl River and Yangtze River Deltas 
(Chen, 2007).
As the coastal cities raced far ahead of the 
interior cities, the Chinese state enhanced its 
steering role in urban growth by prioritising key 
western cities as new hubs of accelerated devel-
opment, to stimulate the catch-up of the vast 
but lagging interior. By designating Chongqing 
as a central government municipality in 1997, 
the state gave this megacity greater autonomy 
and financial support. Chongqing was allowed 
to lower enterprise tax from 33 to 24%, or 
even to 15%, if these projects were located in 
the city’s ETDZ. The state’s steering of urban-
isation not only has involved both the central 
and local government across regions but also 
shifted up and down the administrative struc-
ture depending on the strategic importance of 
given cities.
Speed and scale
Given the strong steering role of the state, the 
fast speed and large scale of China’s urbanisa-
tion is fully expected, and also unprecedented 
in the Global South. With only 13% of its popu-
lation being urban around 1950, China was be-
hind India’s 17% and comparable to the level 
of urbanisation in some parts of Africa today. 
With still less than 20% urban around 1980, 
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China has urbanised much faster than India 
ever since, reaching about 55% urban today 
relative to India’s 35% (Chen, 2014). China 
also stands out among the Global South in add-
ing a large number of new cities and scaling-
up already large cities. With approximately 200 
cities around 1980, China has over 600 cities 
today. Cities with one million-plus population 
in China rose from 20 in 1980 to 102 in 2012, 
whereas the number of million-plus cities in 
fast-urbanising Africa as a whole grew from 
17 to about 50 today. Europe as a whole has 35 
such cities.6
In speeding up urbanisation and building 
large cities, China has created a huge demand 
for imported commodities and energy, mostly 
from the Global South. From a country with 
no private cars to the largest auto market in 
the world, China has dramatically acceler-
ated its petrol consumption. With millions of 
high-rise and lower buildings shooting up in its 
hundreds of large cities that have to be cooled 
and heated, China has led energy consumption 
by the world’s cities. In addition, the millions 
of kilometres of fibre-optic cables in China’s 
skyscrapers and factories require a lot of cop-
per from large mines in Chile and Zambia. 
The evidence is clear that the scale and speed 
of China’s urbanisation drive its huge demand 
for imported commodities and energy (see 
Figure 1 and Campanella, 2008).
As China feeds its urbanisation with 
imported commodities and energy, it has turned 
around in extending its mode of infrastructure-
led urbanisation to the Global South, especially 
Africa. The market share of Chinese compa-
nies in Africa’s construction sector rose sharply 
from 9.9% in 2002 to 40.1% in 2011, while the 
share of US contractors dropped from 24.1 to 
6.7% (Huang and Chen, 2016). A new residen-
tial town near Luanda, Angola built by China 
and empty for some time reminds one of the 
many newly built ghost cities and towns in 
China (Shepard, 2015). Through multiple cross-
national channels, China’s urbanisation not 
only has fed on commodities and energy from 
the Global South but also left its strong imprint 
on the latter’s cities.
Connected and transferable 
development
If urbanisation constitutes a place-based source 
and driver of China’s domestic transformation 
and international influence, the development 
leg of the triangle stretches China’s inside-out-
side connection. On the surface, China seems to 
have followed the footsteps of export-oriented 
industrialisation previously pursued by the 
former East Asian tigers such as South Korea 
and Taiwan. This strategy made sense for China, 
given its then-comparative advantages in lower 
labour and land costs. If we look more closely 
at China’s political institution, territorial and 
demographic scale and regional diversity, 
China has travelled a more distinctive path of 
development, closely tied to its urbanisation, 
that has ultimately translated into a centrifugal 
impact in the Global South.
Relative to the East Asian developmental 
state, the Chinese state has been more pur-
poseful and interventionist since the outset. 
While China’s first SEZs around 1980 were 
similar to the Export Processing Zones set up in 
South Korea and Taiwan during 1965–1970, the 
Chinese government designed and shaped them 
with two more ambitious goals and supportive 
strategies. First, the SEZs were intended to ex-
periment with capitalism and market under a 
centrally planned socialist economy. The zones 
were located on China’s southeast coast, far 
away from the political and economic centres, 
to minimise the spatial spill of potential failure. 
But they were geographically contiguous and 
adjacent with Hong Kong and Taiwan, which 
were willing to move surplus capital and declin-
ing factories over the land and sea borders into 
these zones. The generous tax incentives and 
bold policy reforms in the SEZs, like labour 
contracts, singled the state’s commitment to 
make them successful as a longer-term model 
for subsequent development. Second, the 
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Chinese state went much farther than its South 
Korean and Taiwanese counterparts in build-
ing the physical infrastructure needed for much 
larger-scale manufacturing.
The ‘first mover’ advantages of a few SEZs 
extended into the follow-up development and 
prosperity of large coastal cities from the early 
1980s into the 1990s. The economic gap between 
the booming coastal and lagging inland cities 
grew large. While this was the intended goal 
of securing quicker and more efficient results 
from the much better endowed coastal region, 
it turned out to be an unintended consequence 
of uneven regional development. In response, 
the Chinese state stepped up its interventionist 
role around 2000 when it introduced the so-
called ‘Go West’ initiative. This consisted of a 
set of top-down policies to direct more invest-
ment to the interior and to encourage coastal 
cities to relocate uncompetitive industries to 
the inland cities.
If the state in late East Asian developing 
economies needed to be more engaged and 
interventionist vs the market (Amsden, 1989; 
Wade, 1994), the Chinese state has done much 
more in dealing with serious and complex 
uneven regional development arising from 
spatially targeted development in China’s 
diverse economy. The Chinese approach can 
be characterised as connected and transferable, 
facilitating a staged and coordinated westward 
movement of financial resources and develop-
ment activities (see Figure 2). Besides steering 
coastal cities and firms to shift investment west, 
the state has built up and out an extensive high-
way system and high-speed train network, both 
the world’s longest, that links the coastal region 
to the majority of cities in the interior region 
(zones 1 and 2 in Figure  2). By 2015, China’s 
high-speed network consisted of four vertical 
(north–south) and four horizontal (east–west) 
trunk routes totalling 19,000 km, 9661 of which 
had an average speed of 300 km/hour. By 2025, 
the system is projected to expand to eight verti-
cal and eight horizontal trunk routes with more 
spur lines that will connect all cities of 500,000 
or more residents, and create a 1- to 4-hour 
travel radius between all these cities (Xu, 2017).
With faster and wider transport connections, 
investment has also  moved west also as a re-
sult of spatially differentiated factors of pro-
duction between zones 1 and 2.  The average 
manufacturing wages in China’s central and 
western provinces were only 21 and 25% of the 
coastal average in 2000 and only went up to 39 
and 42% in 2013. This wage differential was a 
key factor in inducing some coastal manufac-
turers to relocate to China’s inland provinces to 
take advantage of lower costs and policy con-
cessions. By 2015, the value of domestic invest-
ment in five central provinces (in zone 2) was 
2.5 times that of foreign investment in China 
(Ann, 2017). The strong and multifaceted role 
of the Chinese state in ameliorating uneven re-
gional development further accentuates the ne-
cessity of state intervention in late or lagging 
development, beyond the East Asian develop-
mental state over three decades ago (Clifton 
et al., 2017). It also serves as a major mechanism 
for connecting and coordinating infrastructure, 
jobs, firms and wealth across cities and regions, 
regarding what Dunford and Liu (2017) call 
‘uneven and combined development’ (U&CD).
To ensure that uneven development can be 
turned into combined and connected develop-
ment, the Chinese state has used its still-strong 
top-down administrative level in creating spe-
cial partnerships between wealthy coastal cit-
ies and poor border cities in the far west. For 
example, Shenzhen and Shanghai have been 
directed to provide economic assistance to 
Kashgar, China’s most western city, located 
near Xinjiang’s border with Pakistan. The 
Shenzhen government has granted 10 billion 
RMB ($1.5 billion) to build a new campus for 
the University of Kashgar. Companies from 
Shanghai have set up factories in Kashgar’s 
Economic and Technological Development 
Zone designated in 2010. In a recent and 
important move of transferable develop-
ment, the Chinese state elevated an expansive 
region encompassing the city of Kashgar to a 
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national level SEZ, with the package of special 
incentives originally granted to Shenzhen and 
other three SEZs. This designation has raised 
Kashgar, an ancient city on the Silk Road, to 
a key city for BRI, granting it the same level 
of national development priority as the Pearl 
River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and 
the northern mega-region including Beijing, 
Tianjin and Hebei province. While the spatial 
extension and transfer of the SEZ model has 
continued since the 1980s, the special transfer 
of both financial resources and special policy 
from China’s southeast coast to the far western 
frontier reflects the significance of ‘Going West’ 
and ‘Going Out’ through BRI, as linked mani-
festations of China’s development practice and 
discourse (Yeh and Wharton, 2016). It accentu-
ates China’s new effort to globalise beyond its 
western borders (from zone 2 into zones 3 and 
4, see Figure 2).
Figure  2. China’s connected and transferable westward development (domestic inter-regional to cross-border regional 
movement).
Note: (i) Zones 1 and 2 split China’s long coastal and expansive inland regions, while Zones 3 and 4 make up vast transborder 
spaces in geographical scope and distance. (ii) Zone 3 comprises the subregions of Asia that border China’s west and south-
west by land. It adds up to a massive crescent encompassing a number of China’s western and southwestern borderlands off 
Yunnan and Xinjiang. (iii) Zone 4 forms the western end of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including the terminuses 
and transit points of a growing number of China-Europe freight trains through Central Asia, and bound for the latter and 
its neighbours to the west and south. (iv) The four zones are intended to denote the connected and sequential extension 
of China’s economic and infrastructure connections from its east coast to its vast interior and far west under the ‘Go West’ 
policies since 2000, and then further west into Central Asia, onto Europe and back with BRI since 2013.
Source: Conceived and drawn by the author.
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Driving alternative globalisation, 
regionally
The spatial intersection between China’s urban-
isation and development moving west repre-
sents its new primary approach to globalisation, 
triggered and fuelled by the official launch of 
BRI in 2013. While China’s global economic 
ties have remained strongest and most exten-
sive through its east coast hubs like Hong Kong 
and Shanghai, its small western border cities 
have begun to channel a new wave of China-
led globalisation from powerful domestic 
sources and places to China’s western frontier 
and far beyond. Building on its legacy of ‘neigh-
bourhood’ or ‘periphery’ diplomacy (Summers, 
2016), China now advances the globally ambi-
tious BRI from and through its “Opening up 
West” initiative and momentum. This overland 
inside-out policy has begun to catalyse catch-up 
development of both sides of China’s western 
borderlands, thus magnifying its overall impact 
in the Global South, including a larger swathe 
of Eurasia not traditionally categorised with 
this label.
In assessing China’s new and spatially var-
ied impact in the Global South today, we need 
to acknowledge a long backdrop seeded over 
six decades ago. At the Bandung Conference 
in Indonesia in 1955—the first large Asian–
African Conference—China, represented by 
Premier Zhou Enlai, played a prominent role 
as the discussion  by the newly independent 
nations focused on tensions with the USA, the 
West in general and other Asian states. That 
conference was key in defining and pushing 
forward the Non-Aligned Movement, built on 
the collectively agreed principles of national 
independence, territorial integrity, and the 
struggle against colonialism and imperialism. 
China was actively involved in this movement 
and later with The Group of 77 promoting the 
economic interests of developing nations. In 
fact, China implemented its ideological affin-
ity with ‘The Third World’ through major aid 
projects for Asian and African countries. While 
very poor, the Chinese government offered 
cumulative aid to Vietnam worth almost $20 
billion in today’s value through 1976 and built 
the Tanzania–Zambia Railway at a cost equiva-
lent of $3.8 billion today during 1970–1975 
(Chen and Myers, 2013). This historical prece-
dent lurks behind a more developed China to 
engage with the Global South today.
Having benefited most as the largest devel-
oping economy from globalisation, China has 
become the kind of new economic power better 
prepared to lead more inclusive globalisation. 
Spanning over 60 countries and 65% of the 
world’s population, including old members and 
what may be labelled a new region of the Global 
South like Central Asia, as well as Europe, BRI 
has a spatially inclusive and diverse coverage. 
With a projected total outlay of over $1 tril-
lion, BRI will dwarf the Marshall Plan finan-
cially, with no request for military alliances. Key 
Chinese government departments driving BRI 
have dubbed it as leading the new globalisation 
2.0.7 According to Liu and Dunford (2016), the 
most salient feature of the BRI approach to 
globalisation is its inclusivity, that differs signifi-
cantly from the neoliberal version of globalisa-
tion. It reflects China’s emphasis is on strategic 
international economic partnerships and multi-
lateral credit to address investment, infrastruc-
ture, employment and economic development’ 
(p. 325), all of which are critical to the Global 
South.
Partly motivating this official posture is a 
set of domestic economic concerns, including 
slower growth, continued production overcap-
acity, consumption trailing investment and an 
increasingly saturated construction market. By 
2006, China was in over-production in 10 indus-
tries, especially steel, aluminium, cement, oil 
refining and wind power (Pieterse, 2015). Since 
2007, China has lost millions of factory jobs due 
to the global financial crisis and accelerated 
automation, creating more surplus labour that 
can no longer be absorbed back in the coun-
tryside. During 2014–2016, China had to reduce 
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steel production amounting to 120% of the 
global total, leading to a loss of 201,000 steel-
workers in 2016 alone.8 These pressures, some 
of which are structural in economic imbal-
ance and others are contingent, like the finan-
cial crisis (Pieterse, 2015), have reinforced the 
powerful push of ‘Go West’ to open up new 
investment outlets, trade channels and con-
struction projects. Of all the domestic drivers, 
China’s construction experience and expertise 
accumulated from building numerous roads 
and bridges and some extraordinary mega-pro-
jects like the Qinghai–Tibet high-speed train 
have turned infrastructure into a main focus 
and strength of China-led globalisation into 
neighbouring Asia.
A pair of case studies
How do we find empirical evidence to inter-
rogate the thesis that China now drives an al-
ternative globalisation that originates from 
deep domestic sources, and traverses and 
influences its western borderlands? Following 
the relational logic crossing from Figures 1 
and 2, I  have identified the Southeast Asian 
and Central Asian subregions (highlighted in 
Figure 2) as empirical cases for a parallel ana-
lysis as opposed to a head-to-head comparison. 
As the guiding rationale for this approach, this 
pair of cases, in both similar and different ways, 
can help us to understand how China has rea-
ligned the inside and outside of the relation-
ship among its urbanisation, development and 
globalisation (Figure  1). More specifically, the 
two cases will illustrate how China, through 
spatially connected domestic and cross-border 
zones, is capable of catalysing catch-up regional 
development in its remote regions, near abroad 
and farther beyond (Figure 2).
The China–Southeast Asia border 
region and beyond
In the first case study, I  trace the policy and 
factor mobility from China’s coastal region 
to its border region with mainland Southeast 
Asia (bold box in row 3, Figure 2). This analysis 
starts with an acknowledgement that border 
cities and regions, which were once remote and 
underdeveloped spaces, have picked up both 
the speed and scope of urban development. 
Small and isolated cities and towns have sprung 
from once politically trivial and economically 
marginal landscapes (Chen, 2005). This process 
has benefited from targeted state policies, more 
open borders and improved connectivity of 
transport networks, especially in China.
Yunnan province in southwestern China, es-
pecially its capital city of Kunming and cities on 
the border with Myanmar and Laos, have ben-
efited considerably from the fortune moving 
their way. While Yunnan had important histor-
ical trade outposts as a key segment of the Silk 
Road’s southwestern route, the current compos-
ition as a province stagnated from the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–1976) through the 1980s, and 
fell much behind the coastal region. The 1990s 
saw a partial return of Yunnan’s border trade. 
The onset of the 2000s brought about China’s 
‘Go West’ campaign, which unleashed new 
opportunities for Yunnan to leverage its favour-
able border location for catch-up development. 
On 6 May 2011 the central government issued 
‘Supporting the Accelerated Construction 
of Yunnan as the Important Outpost for the 
Southwest Region’, which tasked the capital 
city of Kunming to become the international 
hub and ‘bridgehead’ for China’s economic co-
operation with Southeast Asia. In May 2012, 
the Yunnan government approved the estab-
lishment of six border economic cooperation 
zones. This provincial initiative augmented 
the central government’s approval of opening 
border economic cooperation zones in the cit-
ies of Ruili and Wanding bordering Myanmar. 
Playing off as the regional base for the histor-
ical ‘southwest Silk Road’, Yunnan has rebuilt 
the old connections to Southeast Asia through 
its newly revived border cities.
Ruili has been the key city for stimulating 
lagged economic development within and across 
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the border region. Its Jiegao Border Economic 
Development Zone, set up in 1991, promoted 
border trade with the small city of Muse on the 
Myanmar side. Ruili has really taken off since 
August 2013 when the Master Plan of the Ruili 
Experimental Zone was approved by the cen-
tral government. It included 238 new projects 
for boosting Ruili as a gathering place and 
gateway for economic flows with neighbouring 
Southeast Asian economies. Accelerated de-
velopment has transforming this once-sleepy 
border town with a very small population into 
a lively city of over 160,000 people today (Chen 
and Stone, 2017).
This growth momentum has been met and 
matched, albeit to a lesser degree, by Muse, 
which created a 150-hectare border trade zone. 
Since April 2006, Myanmar merchants can freely 
export goods from across the country to Muse 
and secure export licenses on the spot within 
1 day, after a formal sales contract is confirmed 
with Chinese buyers. Furthermore, Myanmar 
upgraded the 460-km-long road that connects 
the border town to Mandalay, its second largest 
city in the central region. This upgrade not only 
reduced the travel time from up to a week to 
12–16 hours but also made the longer journey 
from Muse to Myanmar’s capital Yangon in the 
south more convenient. Now Myanmar traders 
operating in the space between Muse and Ruili 
can board a long-distance bus to Yangon in 24 
hours. Although the road conditions between 
Muse and Mandalay (and Yangon) are not as 
good as between Ruili and Kunming, the im-
provement has elevated Muse as a major hub 
for cross-border trade.
Ruili looms large in Yunnan’s regional role 
in China’s trade with Myanmar. Over 80% 
of Myanmar’s exports to China and 40% of 
its imports from China come across Yunnan’s 
border (Singh, 2016). Ruili accounts for the larg-
est share of this trade, while Muse is Myanmar’s 
busiest among its 15 border trading stations fa-
cing China, Thailand, Bangladesh and Laos. 
As of mid-November 2015, Myanmar’s border 
trade at Muse rose to $3.36 billion from $2.95 
billion in 2014.9 Border trade between Ruili 
and Muse is most intensive at the vibrant jade 
market spanning their boundary. This is where 
Myanmar jade trader Soe Paing sells raw jade. 
His family has been in the jade trade for gen-
erations. While examining various pieces of raw 
jade in his shop-office, he said, ‘Chinese people 
didn’t just start to like jade. They have always 
liked jade and used it for thousands of years’ 
He went on, ‘Our business depends mainly on 
China though since other countries are not as 
fond of jade as the Chinese’.10
Beyond the more conventional cross-bor-
der trade, the city of Ruili has become the 
through point for a gas and oil pipeline that 
China has built from the port city of Kyaukpyu 
on Myanmar’s west coast to Kunming (see 
Figure 3). The gas pipeline became operational 
in 2013 and carried 2.86 million tons of gas in 
2016, accounting for about 5% of China’s total 
imports. The oil pipeline, which was completed 
in 2014, opened in 2017 after a long delay and 
the Myanmar government had agreed to lower 
transit fees. The 771-km pipeline is designed 
to carry 22 million tons of crude a year (about 
442,000 barrels a day) for the Kunming-based 
refinery that can process 13 million tons annu-
ally.11 This new pipeline allows China to move 
crude oil from the Middle East overland and 
faster instead of through the slower and poten-
tially risky narrow Straits of Malacca. More 
relevant to our framework (Figures 1 and 2), the 
pipeline provides a new and added source and 
route of energy supply for accelerated urbanisa-
tion and development in southwestern China.
The smaller and less developed cities on the 
China-Laos border may catch up to Ruili once 
an ambitious cross-border China–Laos Railway 
is built (Figure  4), preceded and prepared by 
enhanced transport development inside Yunnan. 
Under an infrastructure plan priced at over $10 
billion, a rail line from Kunming to the Mohan 
border crossing is under construction. Moreover, 
Yunnan’s train connections to the border have 
been strengthened by the new high-speed train 
from Shanghai to Kunming. Since becoming 
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operational in December 2016, this line, over 
2300 km long, has cut the 40-hour trip to less 
than 10 hours now. It forms a new and vital link 
from zone 1 to zone 2, further integrating the 
dominant coastal megacity of Shanghai and the 
rapidly growing regional hub of Kunming that 
has become the ‘bridgehead’ for China’s eco-
nomic engagement with Southeast Asia.
While the China–Laos Railway was con-
ceived in 2010, the official agreement was not 
signed until November 2015 and ground for 
construction broken in Vientiane in December 
2015. After formal construction was delayed 
without the completion of an environmental 
impact study, the line is now scheduled to be 
completed by the end of 2021. The line starts in 
Kunming and travels southward to the Chinese 
border city of Mohan, until entering Laos 
through the city of Boten. It then travels past 
Vang Vieng and Luang Prabang before arriv-
ing in Vientiane. The Laos government expects 
roughly four million Lao passengers a year to 
use the 414-km railway at first, 6.1 million pas-
sengers in the mid-term and 8.1 million passen-
gers in the long run. According to a Laos deputy 
prime minister, a total of nearly 10 million 
Figure 3. The cross-border China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline: from Kyaukpyu to Kunming through Ruili.
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passengers from China and five other ASEAN 
countries are expected to use the railway annu-
ally, rising to 11.9 million passengers per year 
in the mid-term and 16.5 million in the long 
term.12 China envisions this railway as extend-
ing from Vientiane to the Thai cities of Nong 
Khai and Bangkok (Figure 4), and then all the 
way to Singapore via Malaysia, feeding into the 
Trans-Asian Railway linking to Europe.
Given the project cost of $6 billion relative to 
Laos’ annual GDP of $12 billion, Laos has man-
aged to secure a low-interest 20-year loan of 
$800 million from China’s Export-Import Bank 
and will form a joint venture with China to bor-
row a lot more to cover the rest of the cost.13 An 
optimistic Laos official believes that Laos will 
be able to pay the loan back within 5 years by 
selling to China from five potash mines yet to be 
excavated. But, given the loan’s size relative to 
Laos’ small GDP, pessimistic government offi-
cials worry that the risk of financial crisis and 
high debt will plague Laos after the project is 
completed.14 The International Monetary Fund 
warned in 2017 that Laos’ reserves stood at 
2 months of prospective imports of goods and 
services. It also expressed concerns that public 
debt could rise to around 70% of the economy.13
It is too early to know if this project will pay 
off for both sides. For landlocked Laos, the 
railway makes sense for connecting to outside 
markets, especially if the planned industrial 
zone near Vientiane’s terminal can stimu-
late manufactured exports, and if millions of 
high spending Chinese tourists cross the bor-
der on the train. However, a feasibility study 
by a Chinese company said the railway would 
lose money for the first 11 years. In the mean-
time, some Laos farmers are being denied suf-
ficient government compensation for giving 
up their land to the railway. In contrast, China 
has brought nearly everything, including con-
struction materials and equipment, to the Laos 
project. At the peak of construction, there will 
be an estimated 100,000 Chinese workers.13 
Thus far, China has already benefited from this 
mega-project by putting its surplus construc-
tion material and workforce to use. In the long 
run, China is expected to gain more from better 
overland access to Southeast Asia. This project 
represents one episode of an unequal China–
Asia economic partnership (Holslag, 2015).
From the China–Central Asia border 
region to Europe and back
China’s ‘Go West’ initiative favouring the vast 
interior region has produced a second case of 
connected and transferable development cre-
ating border intensive change and broader 
international connections and ramifications 
(the bold box in row 1, Figure  2). It requires 
a tracing analysis of similar energy and infra-
structure connections but through more linked 
places over larger territories and longer dis-
tances. Of China’s western regions targeted 
for catch-up development, Xinjiang was less 
favourably positioned than Yunnan. In spite 
of its vast size, one-sixth of China’s landmass, 
Figure  4. The planned route of the cross-border China–
Laos railway.
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Xinjiang has only 23 million people, less than 
the city of Shanghai. While rich in natural 
resources like oil and agricultural commodities 
like fruit, Xinjiang lacks transport infrastruc-
ture and manufacturing capacity. Although 
Xinjiang’s large population of minority groups 
is similar to Yunnan, its dominant Uyghur 
group (46% of Xinjiang’s total population), 
with its historical and religious (Islamic) con-
nections abroad, has been seen by the Chinese 
government as a potentially unstable element 
that should be controlled through assimila-
tion and integration. Since the 1950s, the cen-
tral government has relocated large numbers 
of decommissioned military personnel and 
civilians from other provinces, especially from 
coastal cities, to Xinjiang to set up and sustain 
many quasi-military collective farms to sta-
bilise its horticultural and livestock economy 
and border areas, with limited state subsided in-
dustrialisation. This politically motivated policy 
kept Xinjiang’s development away from more 
efficient pathways and in a relatively slow and 
stagnated rut through the beginning years of 
the 21st century.
Despite being further west than Yunnan 
and most westerly in China, Xinjiang has 
received a larger infusion of the westward 
shift of investment and development over 
the last decade, with considerably more mo-
mentum. So much of this has been riding on 
BRI, which has provided an external boost to 
the earlier domestically oriented ‘Go West’ 
initiative. Similar to Ruili, Xinjiang’s border 
region with land ports have benefited the 
most, grown the fastest and spilled out the 
most influence over the borderline and farther 
away. The original border pass—now the city 
of Horgos—has risen as the ‘Ruili of Xinjiang’ 
over a few short years, but with much greater 
ambition and significance.
Horgos was the oldest land port on China’s 
western frontier along the Silk Road and opened 
as a customs checkpoint in 1881. Fast forward 
to 1983 when Horgos, bordering Kazakhstan, 
became one of China’s earliest and most open 
land ports for foreign trade, with the good basic 
infrastructure and convenient custom clear-
ance procedure in China’s western regions. 
However, Horgos fell much behind the boom-
ing cities on China’s southeast coast in the 1980s 
and also Yunnan’s border cities from the 1990s 
to the early 2000s. Fortune turned to Horgos 
in 2006 when China and Kazakhstan agreed to 
establish the China-Kazakhstan International 
Border Cooperation Center, as China’s very 
first border cooperation zone of its kind. Split 
into 3.43 sq km for China and 1.85 sq km for 
Kazakhstan, this enclosed zone straddling the 
China–Kazakhstan borderline offers shared 
infrastructure facilities and linked duty-free 
shopping. In 2014, Horgos was elevated to the 
status of a county-level city covering a total of 
1908 sq km that also includes the large farming 
areas owned by two quasi-military regiments. 
While Horgos’ bounded territory (around 2000 
sq km) is almost as large as that of the megacity 
of Shenzhen, it has only a permanent popula-
tion of 86,500 and thus has a lot of open land 
for new development.
Its current small population aside, Horgos has 
begun to play a disproportionately large role as 
the most important transport hub along China’s 
western border, due to its highly favourable lo-
cation and rapidly developing infrastructure 
connectivity. Situated towards the central point 
of the Eurasian region and as the central sta-
tion along the Eurasian Land Bridge, Horgos 
offers a wide access to Central Asia, West 
Asia and Europe to the west and to China’s 
huge domestic market to the east. The Central 
Asia–China gas pipeline, which originates from 
Turkmenistan and traverses Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, crosses at Horgos into Xinjiang. It 
transported 18.4 billion cubic meters of natural 
gas during the first 2 years of starting to supply 
gas in 2009. It connects to China’s second west-
east gas pipelines from Horgos and stretches 
8704 km to Hong Kong. In the reverse direc-
tion, the train from China’s end of the Eurasian 
Land Bridge (the coastal city of Lianyungang) 
through Horgos and Central Asia to Rotterdam 
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ships 22 million tons of goods annually. From 
the Horgos bonded trade zone, trucks from 
Kazakhstan clear customs in a few minutes and 
deliver Xinjiang’s fresh fruit to Almaty’s street 
markets and dining tables in less than 24 hours, 
as opposed to the old days when it would take 
over a week, defeating the purpose of fresh 
fruit trade.
Further north from Horgos is another land 
port (Alataw Pass) and the city of Alashankou. 
With only a small train station in this remote 
mountainous corner of China until 1990, 
when the China-Soviet cross-border railway 
was completed, Alashankou began to grow 
the transit train cargo but remained highly 
underdeveloped locally, and insignificant for 
China’s global economic weight. The place’s 
fortunes turned in 2011 when the first China-
Europe freight train from Chongqing passed 
through its border gate and then Central Asia 
on its way to Duisburg, Germany. Like Horgos, 
Alashankou was upgraded to a county-level 
city in 2012. Since the announcement of BRI 
in 2013, Alashankou has become another key 
border hub as the transit point for most of the 
China-Europe cargo trains. This overland train 
route has different comparative advantages 
over either air or sea shipping. According to 
an international logistics expert,15 rail takes 
between 23 and 25 days (more hours added than 
shown in Table 1, due to first and last mile truck-
ing), ocean 50–55  days and air freight around 
10 days. In terms of price, rail service charges 
$4000 for a 40-foot container (FEU, each car-
rying 9600 kg of content), compared with $3000 
by sea and $37,000 by air. Rail is much cheaper 
than air, while sea travel is cheaper still but 
takes too long. For many time-sensitive supply 
chains today like handsets and laptops (made 
by HP in Chongqing for Europe), cutting a few 
days off shipping reduces stock in transit and 
thus saves much money (Figure 5).16
The China-Europe Railway has created a 
new channel for more Chinese cities to trade 
with Europe. There are now 52 routes estab-
lished between 32 Chinese cities and 32 cities 
in 12 European countries, including lines going 
through northern China, Mongolia and Russia 
to Europe (see Table 1). Alashankou saw 3800 
trains pass through and accounted for 76% of 
the approximately 5000 trains as of September 
2017.17 Similar to Ruili and Horgos as energy 
supply relay points, Alashankou is where the 
Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline passes through. 
Costing $700 million to lay and running 988 
km from Atasu in Kazakhstan to Alashankou, 
the pipeline was completed in 2005 and began 
operating in May 2006. While its designed cap-
acity was to ship one million barrels of crude 
oil per day or 10 million tons of crude oil per 
year into western China, the line has been car-
rying up to 20 million tons per year (Fazilov 
and Chen, 2013).
As this second case illustrates, the mode and 
spatial shift of urbanisation and development 
in China have produced a longer and more 
complex chain of energy and infrastructure 
links from zone 1 to zone 4 (Figure 2) and back. 
Despite the huge distance between China’s 
coast and western land border, the strong state 
has steered and transferred the early model of 
Shenzhen SEZ all the way to Ruili and Horgos 
by building them up as newly favoured areas 
for catch-up urbanisation and development. 
This transferable development has only been 
accelerated by massive investment in highways 
and railways to connect coastal, interior and 
border cities. Although these key border cit-
ies remain relatively small, certainly by China’s 
urban scale, they have quickly been turned into 
gateways for extending China’s economic con-
nections and influence into Central Asia and 
further to Europe. In return, they receive and 
relay new flows of energy and traded goods 
such as German cars, French wine and Spanish 
olive oil from zone 4 via Central Asia (zone 
3)  to prospering megacities like Chongqing 
and Chengdu in southwestern China (zone 2 in 
Figure 2).
Yet, like the China–Southeast Asia case, 
challenges face China–Central Asia connec-
tions. On the Chinese side, the infrastructure 
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provision in Horgos or Alashankou has far 
outpaced the shortage of local human capital, 
forcing the Xinjiang government to offer high 
salaries and housing subsidies to lure talents 
from interior provinces. Externally, the weaker 
commitment and fewer resources in Central 
Asia for cross-border cooperation have cre-
ated asymmetrical power relations. Given the 
inability of the Kazakh government to fully 
build up the commercial and logistic facilities in 
its smaller segment of the border cooperation 
zone, a Chinese company has stepped over to 
build it, thus creating a greater power leverage 
for China over Kazakhstan.18
Conclusion
In conceptualising China’s domestic transfor-
mation and global rise through a triangular lens 
anchored to urbanisation, development and glo-
balisation, we begin to see how China has made 
a big difference to the drivers, mechanisms and 
outcomes of these three ‘master’ processes. The 
Chinese experience presses us to trace the mani-
festation of its development and globalisation 
deeply into how China’s cities have been (re)
built. It also clarifies how the undesirable con-
sequences of dramatic urbanisation, especially 
economic imbalance and regional inequality, are 
being mediated by a strong state’s connected and 
Figure 5. The main China–Europe freight train route through Central Asia.
Source: Chen and Mardeusz (2015, 6–7).
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Globalisation redux
transferable development policies. Motivated 
by its spatially phased urbanisation and devel-
opment, China has adopted an alternative and 
ambitious approach to globalisation through 
BRI that privileges intra- and inter-regional 
infrastructure within and across borders for 
facilitating peripheral urbanisation, catch-up 
development and more inclusive globalisation.
I argue that China’s urbanisation is the deep-
est source and strongest driver of its westward 
development and outward globalisation, as well 
as their mutual reinforcement. As the high speed 
and large scale of urbanisation triggered by the 
SEZs led to the boom of coastal cities and thus 
regional inequality, the state has stepped up its 
steering role in accelerating and scaling up in-
terior urbanisation and extending the largely 
successful model of SEZs to western border 
cities. This policy has led to somewhat lagging 
but not permanently delayed ‘peripheral ur-
banisation’ by upgrading long neglected small 
border cities. While they are not comparable to 
coastal cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai, their 
importance can no longer be  measured only 
in size and functional strength. They have be-
come critical for transmitting China’s domestic 
development impulses out to the underdevel-
oped border cities and regions of neighbouring 
countries. In other words, the latent strength of 
once vibrant Silk Road cities like Kashgar and 
Horgos has been activated and updated to suit 
the needs of BRI. The faster growth and larger 
role of these cities are directing our analytical 
attention from the financial hubs at the top of 
the global urban hierarchy to the understudied 
small and border cities at its bottom. It also 
lends some credence to the notion of ‘planetary 
urbanisation’ reaching remote places and blur-
ring traditional boundaries (Brenner, 2014). To 
the extent that this qualifies as China urbanis-
ing from the Global South to influence other 
Global South cities, it can make these ‘ordinary 
cities’ (Robinson, 2006) ‘special’ in their new 
development trajectory. With the potential to 
spur growth of near-abroad cities like Luang 
Prabang on the China–Laos Railway and of 
Central Asian cities along the China-Europe 
Railway, China’s border cities such as Ruili and 
Horgos can play a long-term role in producing 
more connected spatial economies and reduc-
ing within- and between-country inequalities 
that make up the postcolonial geography of a 
rising Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2011; 
Raghuram et al., 2014).
From the development vantage point of the 
triangular framework (Figure 1), the two cases 
renew our understanding of the local, national 
and global dimensions of development relative 
to urbanisation and globalisation. We tend to 
see China as having pursued export-oriented 
industrialisation led by a stronger version of 
the East Asian developmental state. As many 
Chinese cities, especially those with factory 
dominant industrial zones on the coast, pros-
pered from their manufactured exports, their 
development has been sustained by rich rev-
enues from land sales for both industrial use 
and (increasingly) real estate construction. 
Of the total local revenues in 2016, land sales 
and transfers fees accounted for almost 60%. 
As urbanisation-fuelled development has pro-
duced serious regional inequality, the state 
has addressed it aggressively through what 
I  call connected and transferable develop-
ment policies, leveraging the much more spa-
cious and cheaper land resources in the west. 
Building transport infrastructure to connect to 
the smaller and the less developed cities in the 
west has more room and cushion for China to 
rebalance its national economy by reducing the 
concentration of wealth and production in its 
eastern cities. In addition, small border cities 
like Ruili and Horgos would not have devel-
oped as fast without receiving the transfer of 
the SEZ policy and practice from the coast. 
Despite this policy mobility, over-investment 
fuelled by BRI without regard for different 
local and regional conditions has led to under-
utilised infrastructure and even entire new 
‘ghost cities’ like the New City outside Lanzhou 
(Shepard, 2015), the capital city of Gansu pro-
vince, bordering Xinjiang.
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Globally, China’s rapid urbanisation has 
translated into some kind of development op-
portunity for certain Global South countries 
through the latter’s large exports of commodi-
ties and energy. This development benefit is, 
however, unstable as China’s slower urban-
isation and development in recent years has 
already dampened the growth of the Global 
South’s export of commodities and energy. 
Due to the contraction of China’s construction 
market, China, which accounts for half of the 
global production of steel and cement, tries to 
export its surplus steel and cement as part of its 
push to build more infrastructure in the Global 
South, and thus may suppress the latter’s com-
modity prices further. In its infrastructure-led 
globalisation under BRI, China also brings 
larger numbers of its own construction workers 
to overseas mega-projects like the China–Laos 
Railway, who interact little with from local 
communities due to language and cultural bar-
riers. This has contributed to isolated riots in 
parts of Central Asia, where Chinese workers 
in Kyrgyzstan were attacked for having more 
privileged working conditions over domestic 
workers. If China continues to create little local 
employment for large overseas infrastructure 
projects, it will fall short of securing the full po-
tential positive local impact of these projects in 
their Global South countries and cities.
Finally, as China’s urbanisation and develop-
ment have become more externally connected, 
they have reshaped the current phase of glo-
balisation through an unconventional com-
bination of strategic means and spatial fixes. It 
reflects the coupling of scale and connectivity 
of China’s global economic power that origi-
nates from deep inside its domestic economic 
restructuring and extends far out in an uneven 
manner. China is pioneering infrastructure-
oriented globalisation on a historically un-
precedented scale in the Global South. While 
China is expected to globalise by relocating its 
labour-intensive manufacturing to the cheaper 
locations in the Global South, it has gone fur-
ther in ‘exporting’ its civil engineering and 
construction expertise and experience in build-
ing roads, bridges and power stations across 
much of the Global South. China’s crucial role 
in building infrastructure beyond its borders 
is timely and significant in light of the global 
infrastructure gaps. According to McKinsey 
Global Institute (2016), the world needs to in-
vest about 3.8% of GDP, or an average of $3.3 
trillion, to support economic growth, with 60% 
of this need coming from the Global South; 
yet the world invests only $2.5 trillion a year 
today, creating a huge gap of $0.8 trillion, or 
$350 billion a year. Having invested 8–9% of 
its GDP in infrastructure at home and abroad, 
China is capable of meeting a disproportionate 
part of the global infrastructure gap, which 
renders infrastructure a hallmark of its brand 
of globalisation and complicates the more con-
ventional view of China as an export-driven 
manufacturing power.
While expecting the more expansive and con-
nected cross-border transport infrastructure 
to stimulate quick manufacturing as at home, 
China’s launch of many cargo trains to Europe 
through Central Asia may sustain its declining 
manufacturing bases in its coastal and central 
regions, while generating more domestic con-
sumption by importing more European goods. 
By building and extending infrastructure to and 
through its far western region, China expects 
the feedback benefits of sustaining its main do-
mestic manufacturing bases and rebalancing 
the entire economy to consumption, especially 
in the interior. China’s priority for multiplying 
cross-border transport connections to the west 
has also elicited reciprocal moves from Central 
Asia, as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have re-
cently agreed to build a new road from Andijan 
through the border city of Irkeshtam to Kashgar 
in Xinjiang. (Kashgar is the Chinese end of the 
ambitious China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), a critical cog of the BRI wheel.) This 
will create the shortest route for Uzbekistan to 
export organic vegetables and fruit to the large 
China market. China’s growing cross-border 
ties with Central Asia, and through the latter, 
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with Europe, is ‘re-centring’ Eurasia as a geo-
politically and now geoeconomically significant 
region of the world.
As globalisation is heading into perhaps a cri-
sis phase, which is debated in this special issue 
of CJRES, I  have presented China as a new 
power spreading footprints and creating some 
urbanisation and development opportunities 
in the Global South in a way that may refash-
ion the course of globalisation. China’s strong 
influence in the Global South has grown from 
the co-evolution of its domestic urbanisation 
and development. This inside-out process is 
capable of positioning China as a different kind 
of globaliser vs the Global South. By combin-
ing an analysis of two cases through the frame-
work (Figure  1) and its associated scheme of 
connected domestic and cross-border regional 
development (Figure 2), I have revealed some 
hidden and missed intersections  and interde-
pendencies between China’s domestic eco-
nomic and spatial restructuring and distinctive 
approach to globalisation, using infrastructure 
as the main driver to ‘Go West’ in order to go 
further west via BRI. This process has opened 
a new research vision and focus onto small but 
rapidly growing Chines border cities and simi-
lar near-abroad cities that will become more 
important for understanding the shifting spaces 
of globalisation, and thus deserve our attention.
China-led globalisation, promising and sig-
nificant as it may be, suffers from both internal 
and external constraints. Huge investment in 
building large-scale infrastructure in the Global 
South has contributed to China’s debt rising 
to 300% of its GDP. From the Global South, 
for example, the inability of the Sri Lankan 
government to meet the interest payment on 
an official $8 billion loan from China for con-
structing Hambantota Port, a key link of BRI, 
has recently allowed the partially state-owned 
China Merchants Ports Holdings to get a con-
trolling stake in this port.19 While the debt bur-
den may force China to take fewer risks and 
slow down its infrastructure-driven global 
strategy, the limited financial ability to service 
debts on projects like the China–Laos Railway 
can translate into a broader concern among 
the Global South about becoming dependent 
on China. It is up to China to temper its global 
economic power with a more responsible and 
equitable approach if it is to live up to its pro-
fessed goal and leading role in fostering South–
South cooperation.
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